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“RUM, SODOMY, AND THE LASH”: WHAT THE MILITARY THRIVES ON
AND HOW IT AFFECTS LEGAL RECRUITMENT AND LAW SCHOOLS*
SHARRA E. GREER, WARRINGTON S. PARKER, III,
ELIZABETH L. HILLMAN, AND DIANE H. MAZUR**

I. OPENING REMARKS
MS. GREER:
Winston Churchill once said that “Naval Tradition is just rum, sodomy,
and the lash.” I’m Sharra Greer. I’m the director of Law and Policy for the
Service Members’ Legal Defense Network. We’re a national nonprofit dedicated
to ending “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and related forms of discrimination. We’re a
legal services lobbying and litigation organization. Today’s panel is an
1
examination of FAIR v. Rumsfeld; what law schools, law students, and the legal
community can do in the wake of the decision to continue the commitment to
nondiscrimination; the efforts to end the discrimination within the military; and
a discussion about the relationship that could be, should be, and does exist
between the law students, the law schools, the military, and the military legal
community.
Today we have an esteemed panel. With me is Warrington Parker. He is a
partner at Heller Ehrman LLP. Prior to that, he was an assistant United States
attorney. He was also a key part of the FAIR litigation team. Next to Mr. Parker
is Professor Beth Hillman. She is a professor of Law and the Director of Faculty
Development at Rutgers—Camden. She is also an expert on the U.S. Military
Justice System, a former Air Force officer and the author of Defending America:
2
Military Culture and the Cold War Court-Martial, a book on military justice.
Professor Hillman previously taught history at the Air Force Academy and at
Yale University. We also have with us Professor Diane Mazur, who is a
professor of law at the University of Florida. Professor Mazur writes in the area
of civil military relations under the constitution and is also a former Air Force
officer. She’s the author of many articles in this area, including “A Blueprint for
3
Law School Engagement with the Military.”
* Based on panel remarks presented at the 2006 Lavender Law Conference, Sept. 8, 2006,
2:00 p.m. EST, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C.
** The panelists are, respectively: Director of Law & Policy, Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network; Shareholder, Heller Ehrman LLP; Professor and Director of Faculty Development, Rutgers
School of Law–Camden; Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law.
1. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
2. ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN, DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE COLD WAR
COURT-MARTIAL (POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA) (2005).
3. Diane H. Mazur, A Blueprint for Law School Engagement with the Military, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY
L. & POL’Y 473 (2005).
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Each panelist will make their remarks and then we will open the floor to
questions. I hope this will be a good discussion. So, without further ado, I will
turn things over to Warrington Parker.
II. FAIR V. RUMSFELD AND THE SOLOMON AMENDMENTS
MR. PARKER:
On March 6, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
4
the Solomon Amendment in FAIR v. Rumsfeld, a case brought by the Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), the Society for American Law
Teachers (SALT), and several individual plaintiffs. FAIR is an association of law
schools and law faculties whose members have policies opposing discrimination
5
based on, inter alia, sexual orientation. FAIR contended that the Solomon
6
Amendment violates the First Amendment rights of its members by
conditioning federal funds to universities on its members’ affirmative support of
military recruitment on campus—recruitment that blatantly excludes openly
gay, lesbian, and bisexual law students. The Supreme Court decided that law
schools’ and law faculties’ First Amendment free speech rights were not violated
by the Solomon Amendment because law schools and faculties remain free to
voice their opposition to the military’s discriminatory “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
policy.
The Solomon Amendment, named for Rep. Gerald B.H. Solomon, R-N.Y.,
was first enacted in 1994 and denied Department of Defense funding to any
7
schools that prohibited the military from recruiting on campus. In 1996,
Congress extended the law’s reach to include funding from the Departments of
8
Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services. This second Solomon
legislation put law schools at risk of losing federal financial aid monies that are
critical to many students. The new law forced schools to choose between
protecting students who are on financial aid from economic and educational
hardship and protecting students who are gay or lesbian from discrimination.
The Solomon Amendment was revised again in 1999, when Rep. Barney Frank,
D-Mass., pushed through an exemption for federal monies used for financial
9
aid, and again in 2001, when alterations pushed by the Republican leadership
on the House Armed Services Committee made it so that an entire university
would lose its federal funding if any of its constituent schools blocked access to
10
recruiters. This alteration significantly strengthened the Act, as the military had
sought access mostly to law schools, which receive little in federal money,
unlike medical schools, which are not usually targeted by recruiters.
The Solomon Amendment created, as the law schools viewed, a clash
between the nondiscrimination policies of the law schools and the military’s
policy regarding gays and lesbians. In response, many law schools permitted the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1297.
Id. at 1302.
10 U.S.C. § 983 (West Supp. 2006).
Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1547 (1994) (amended in 1999, 2002, and 2004).
Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 541(a), 110 Stat. 315 (1996) (amended in 1999, 2002, and 2004).
Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 549(a)(1), 113 Stat. 609 (1999) (amended in 2002 and 2004).
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1704(b)(1), (3), 116 Stat. 2314 (2002) (amended in 2004).
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military to recruit on campus but asked that they recruit at locations separate
from the respective law schools. For example, the University of Southern
California (USC) asked the military to recruit at the Reserves Officers Training
Corps (ROTC) building located on the University’s main campus instead of
recruiting with the other legal recruiters.
For years, the military accepted these accommodations because they
maintained strong recruiting success rates for their Judge Advocate General’s
(JAG) Corps. In fact, the military would often write letters to elite law schools
such as New York University Law School noting that it had so many applicants
that it had to deny employment positions to many qualified candidates. Even at
USC, there was substantial turnout for JAG positions despite the modified
recruiting format.
After 9/11, the military began to insist that they be afforded the same
access enjoyed by other recruiters. Though only an anecdotal, qualitative,
visceral reaction drove this demand, the military began to insist it was
necessary. Law schools came together and discussed alternative arrangements
consistent with their nondiscrimination policies. The military, however, said
they would discuss alternatives only at the same time that the government
considered the law schools’ federal funding. This debate continued until 2003,
when an association of law schools and law professors formed FAIR and sued
the government, claiming that the Solomon Amendment violated the First
Amendment.
First Amendment doctrine grants several freedoms including: (1) the right
to be free from compelled speech; (2) the right to speak and not to host speech;
11
and (3) the freedom to associate. FAIR made three arguments based on First
Amendment doctrine against the Solomon Amendment requirements. FAIR also
argued that the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” is implicated here
because the Solomon Amendment places the unconstitutional conditions of
compelled speech and compelled association in return for federal funds.
First, because the Solomon Amendment required law schools to serve
military recruiters with services that are equal in quality and in scope to the
services that the schools provide to employers who do not discriminate, the
government is compelling the law schools to promulgate speech that they
12
vehemently oppose. The services being required of the law schools are
essentially communicative actions such as: distributing, posting, and printing
literature; making introductions; and sponsoring private forums for exchange of
13
information.
Forcing law schools to carry the military’s inherently
discriminatory message through these communicative actions is a form of
government compelled speech that is against the First Amendment.
Second, FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment deprived the law
schools of their right to speak by essentially forcing them to cancel or minimize
14
their antidiscrimination policies. The First Amendment protects the right of law

11. Brief for Respondent at 16, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-1152) [hereinafter
FAIR, Respondent Brief], available at 2005 WL 2347175.
12. FAIR, Respondent Brief, supra note 11, at 21.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 23.
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schools to convey the messages they choose and not to host speech that directly
contradicts or eliminates those messages. Ironically, one of the main cases
supporting that argument is Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
15
Group of Boston. In Hurley, members of Boston’s GBLT community were denied
permission to march in the St. Patrick’s Day Parade organized each year by a
16
veteran’s group. The veteran’s group argued that since it was their parade and
since the event was privately organized, it was their right not to be affiliated
with the sort of speech that would be conveyed by the GBLT group. The Court
agreed, holding that the veteran’s group was a First Amendment speaker and
the selection process for who would march was essentially First Amendment
17
speech.
Third and finally, FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment required
their respective law schools to collaborate with military recruiters in promoting
18
an unjust message. Thus these law schools had a right to deny full access to
their communities from associations who did not share their views.
19
FAIR was unsuccessful in the District Court, successful in the Third
20
Circuit, and thoroughly unsuccessful in the Supreme Court. The Court held
that the law schools were not being asked to promulgate speech. Compelledspeech violations under the First Amendment occur when the speaker’s own
message is affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate. This situation
does not amount to promulgation of military speech because the law schools
remained free to voice their opposition to military recruiting policies. As a result
21
of the FAIR decision, it is possible to urinate on the American flag, but it is not
possible to exclude military recruiters as a form of protest. Under the Court’s
rationale, Congress can tell law schools not to exclude the military recruiters,
which is akin to telling law schools not to post a sign saying “No Whites Need
Apply.” With the Rumsfeld v. FAIR decision, law schools would have to
articulate reasons other than opposition to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” to justify any
decisions to deny military recruiters placement locations on the law school
campus.

15. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
16. Id. at 558.
17. Randall Bezanson & Michelle On-Ja Choe, Speaking Out of Thin Air: A Comment on Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2002).
18. FAIR, Respondent’s Brief, supra note 11, at 17.
19. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.J. 2003)
(holding that the Solomon Amendment did not intrude upon the law schools’ ability to express their
views, unlike in Hurley or other First Amendment cases).
20. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding that the Solomon Amendment “compelled law schools to express [a] message with which
they disagreed” and “impeded [the] law schools’ right of expressive association” (alterations
added)).
21. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In Johnson, the respondent’s burning of the flag
constituted expressive conduct given the context and history of the flag, and thus it was speech
protected by the First Amendment, whereas FAIR held that the law schools’ act of treating the
military differently from other recruiters was not expressive. Cf. FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 1297,
1311 (2006) (“Unlike flag burning, the conduct here is not so inherently expressive that it warrants
protection . . . .”).
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The Court said that the second argument, regarding the hosting of speeches
and the right to speak, was not of merit because nothing was being hosted and
no confusion existed between the military’s recruiting purposes on campus and
the law school’s anti-discrimination message. Unlike in Hurley, where a parade
has a genuine expressive quality, law school recruiting services—such as
recruiting emails, notices, receptions, and interviews—are not expressive by
nature. Prior to the Solomon Amendment, law schools showed their
disagreement with the military’s policy with conduct such as treating the
military recruiters differently from other recruiters. The Court held that such
actions alone are not expressive, but instead are pure conduct with little speech
content.
Finally, the Court held that the right of association had little meaning in
this context because there was no interference with the law school’s mission.
22
Unlike in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in which the Boy Scouts freedom of
expressive association was violated by a state law requiring them to accept gay
members, here the military was not insinuating itself as a member of the law
23
schools. The Court held that the military recruiters were still outsiders entering
law schools with the minimal purpose of recruiting students, not becoming
24
members of the schools expressive association.
With the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” federal funding conditions
are not unconstitutional if they can be directly imposed by Congress. Here,
because Congress is constitutionally able to directly impose the Solomon
Amendment’s access requirements upon law schools (because there is no
violation the First Amendment), the Solomon Amendment’s conditions for
25
federal funds were not unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has seemingly held with the FAIR decision that sexual
orientation discrimination exists only in the grossest sense, such as when
Colorado passed a statewide initiative to deprive equal rights to gays and
26
lesbians. Had other discriminated groups been involved here, this decision
would have come out much differently. Had the military, for example,
discriminated on the basis of race or gender, the court would have almost
certainly allowed law schools to exercise their First Amendment rights by
excluding military recruiters.
III. MILITARY NEEDS AND MILITARY LAWYERS
PROF. HILLMAN:
The first part of the title of our Panel is “Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash.”
Sharra Greer already provided some background about the history of the
military and its discrimination related to homosexuality. It’s the second part of

22. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
23. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1301.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1300.
26. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an amendment to the Colorado state
constitution preventing any town, city, or county from taking any legislative, executive, or judicial
action to protect gays and lesbians from sexual orientation discrimination had no rational basis, was
based in pure animus against gays and lesbians as a class, and was thus unconstitutional).
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the panel title that I’m going to talk about now: “what the military thrives on
and how it affects legal recruitment in law schools,” especially “what the
military thrives on.” I want to focus on the military itself in order to build a
larger context for understanding these issues. I think our efforts to bring
equality into military service, and to bring dignity to gay and lesbian citizens
and service members, should take into account the realities of military service.
We should understand the essential mission of the armed forces, what the
military is all about, and the demographic changes that have already taken place
in the Armed Forces over the course of thirty years of a volunteer military.
I also want to suggest that when we think about not only the military, but
about lawyers in the military, we should first understand the changing role of
law and legal professionals in the armed forces. We have witnessed, in the last
half century, a massive legalization of military operations. In today’s military,
lawyers are more important than ever before in the prosecution of war. Their
counsel affects the management of all military operations and all military
personnel decisions. They help to establish policies for occupation forces and for
detainee operations. Because of the essential role of military lawyers in making
military operations possible, I think it’s important that we understand what we
are getting ourselves into—as a country and as a minority group—as we work
toward fair and reasonable policies with respect to military personnel and
homosexuality.
To do that, I want to talk about two things on which the military thrives:
maintaining the legitimacy of war and ensuring there are enough people to fill
the ranks of soldiers. Preserving the lawfulness of state violence is essential to
military operations and is an important part of what military lawyers do.
Whether or not this is a good idea—that is, whether we as lawyers ought to be
engaged in preserving the legitimacy of war—is a part of a conversation that we
rarely engage in when we discuss fairness and equality in military personnel
policies. It’s not only essential that the military maintain the lawfulness of war,
it’s important that it fill the ranks with people who will perform effectively. The
United States has chosen to do that through a volunteer force since the end of
the Vietnam War. That decision—the decision to end conscription and forced
service in favor of a volunteer army—has profound political and social
implications. Many of those implications have been explored by my fellow
panelist, Diane Mazur, whose work I recommend to you. Today, to make sure
that we understand who is serving in the military right now, I will focus on
military demographics and their evolution over time.
My first topic is how the United States and its armed forces help to
maintain the legitimacy of war and protect the legality of military operations.
The armed forces rely on war to justify the tremendous investments that the
nation makes in national defense and, now, homeland security. More narrowly,
and more relevant to discussing legal recruitment and the role of law schools in
the process of preparing students to become judge advocates, it’s not merely the
existence of armed conflict that justifies a United States military operation, but
rather the specific legitimacy of an individual military action in which the
United States gets involved. That legitimacy is determined by the reasons that
motivate a military operation, by the conduct of service members during the
operation, and by the resolution of legal issues—such as the repatriation of
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prisoners of war or the payment of compensation for damages—related to the
operation. The stakes here are high for military professionals: War must be
legitimate for military leaders to be respected, for military forces to be effective,
and to provide incentives for service members to act with restraint in dangerous
situations. Because of the centrality of lawfulness in postmodern military
operations, that is, in operations that take place in environments of international
scrutiny, mindfulness about human rights, and proliferating means of
communicating information, lawyers play a very important role in setting and
enforcing policies before, during and after armed conflict.
The members of each service’s Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) corps are
critical to the military’s effort to promote lawfulness during military operations.
Judge advocates implement the military justice system, which is the separate
system of criminal trials and criminal code to which service members (and even
retired service members) are subject. Judge Advocates run courts-martial and
now also military commissions, which are governed by a newly minted and
untested set of legal procedures. JAG officers also play a central role in the noncriminal justice aspects of military operations, including the now-notorious
handling of detainees and prisoners of war.
Who are these JAG officers who are burdened with such great
responsibilities? Candidates for the JAG corps are recruited out of our activeduty military forces and our law schools. At Rutgers I talk to many students
who are interested in going into the JAG corps. They seek me out because of my
military background and because I teach military law. Although I was not a
lawyer in the military, I know many JAGs, and during my service as a line
officer in the Air Force, I became familiar with many military legal issues. Many
students are interested in serving as military lawyers—with good reason: There
exist great opportunities to practice in all kinds of areas of law in the armed
forces, and to contribute to the public in important and critical ways. Young
judge advocates get exposure and experience that is difficult to find in nongovernmental jobs for young lawyers. Part of a military lawyer’s duties involve
the criminal justice system, including the military commission system; part
engages the larger context of military operations in peace and war; and part
concerns the management of internal military personnel issues, including
enforcement of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.
I believe it is a mistake to counsel persons interested in joining the
military’s legal corps without talking about the responsibility of military
lawyers to enforce existing personnel rules, including the legal discrimination
against gays and lesbians that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy embraces.
Those rules also include many limitations on the service of women. Yet we don’t
talk about such policies very often when we discuss the appeal of service in the
JAG corps. Instead, we tend to celebrate the toleration of many openly lesbian
and gay service members and the expansion of women’s opportunities in the
military. There are, however, still significant legal discriminations against men
and against women in the Armed Forces today. The draft is male-only. The
prohibition on assigning women to direct ground combat units (the definition of
which is a very murky process that does not survive close examination)
continues to make many jobs off limits to women in the armed forces. A GAO
report sent to Congress in 2005 estimated that the five percent of enlisted
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occupational specialties and one percent of officer career fields that remain
27
closed to women constitute fifteen to twenty percent of all military positions.
This report’s lack of statistical precision is uncharacteristic of military social
science; it reflects the inherent difficulty of separating “combat” from “noncombat” jobs. This sort of personnel policy is overseen by military lawyers, who
make recommendations about compliance with state, federal, and international
law to commanders, and who provide legal counsel when personnel problems
arise, as they inevitably do.
Military lawyers help to enforce legitimacy in criminal justice outcomes as
well as in personnel policies. The war in Iraq has created a massive criminal
docket for the armed forces. We have held many courts martial, some of which
you’ve no doubt read about—the Abu Ghraib courts-martial appeared on the
front pages for months. But over the last five years, most of those crimes
committed by deployed service-members have been “garden variety” crimes,
not violent war crimes or sordid sexual abuse. The crimes most frequently
committed in Iraq and Afghanistan have been classified by the military as those
“related to alcohol”; second on the list is “false official statements,” another
28
common, minor criminal offense prosecuted at court martial. In the much less
frequent but high profile cases about which you have read—the torture of
detainees and atrocities committed in the field against civilians—military
lawyers face a tremendous challenge in trying to gauge the appropriate extent of
criminal responsibility. JAG officers help to determine how far up the chain of
command accountability ought to lie for individual and group misconduct in
these politically delicate, highly scrutinized situations.
Many military lawyers, not only those who reach very high military grades,
but also captains and majors who are still in relatively early stages of their
careers, participate in decisions that establish critical standards of legality in
areas of military operations such as interrogation policy and detention
procedures. Yet some top lawyers have not been listened to, as you’ve likely
seen reported in the newspapers. Uniformed lawyers have been dismissed by
high ranking civilian officials in the Department of Defense and in the White
House, with their guidance about military commissions and other aspects of
detainee operations particularly being ignored. So, one of the constraints that
affects military lawyers mirrors a constraint that affects all military officers and
troops: Ultimately, service members must obey the orders of their commanders.
When their judgment is in conflict with the judgment of their commanders, they
don’t have a lot of options, especially in the kind of career-oriented, self-selected
military that we have today. That poses special difficulties for military lawyers,
whose responsibilities include defending not only the Constitution and

27. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: REPORTING ADDITIONAL
SERVICEMEMBER DEMOGRAPHICS COULD ENHANCE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 38–39, 45 (2005)
[hereinafter GAO, MILITARY PERSONNEL 2005], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d05952.
pdf. The total percentage of off-limits jobs is much higher than the percentage of off-limits military
occupations because of the high number of troops assigned to the relatively short list of “direct
ground combat” occupations like the infantry.
28. See, e.g., CODE COMM. ON MIL. JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT §§ 3–6 (2005) (reporting on the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard JAGs for 2005), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.
gov/annual/FY05AnnualReport.pdf.
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promoting justice, but also meeting their commanding officers’ demands. In
order to keep war legitimate, then, military lawyers help to improve the
effectiveness of the armed forces on the ground, to preserve American standards
of law and human rights, and to respect international standards and the laws of
war. This is no easy task.
The second issue I want to raise is another aspect of military operations in
which military lawyers play a crucial role—and another area in which it is
difficult to reconcile legal and military obligations. That topic concerns how the
United States fills its ranks of soldiers with troops. Personnel policies are a
critical part of any effective armed force; a military must not only operate within
a larger structure of legal effectiveness and legitimacy, it must have people in
uniform who can actually carry out assigned missions in accordance with
appropriate laws and regulations. Any commander in the Armed Forces would
tell you that her most important resource is her troops. The people who serve in
the military are essential to its success. In the all-volunteer force that we have
today, the people who serve are not the same group as in past periods of
American history such as World War II or the Vietnam War. Understanding
these demographic transformations is an important part of appreciating the
recruiting challenges that face military leaders and the relationship between the
military and civilian leadership in the United States. Although our focus today
is on recruiting in law schools, that subset of military recruiting is but a tiny
piece of the overall picture. Because of that reality, and because personnel
policies and recruiting are influenced by law and policy in which military
lawyers have a hand in developing and executing, I want to spend a few
minutes discussing that bigger picture of military recruiting.
Military recruiting is a complex phenomenon. Even identifying success or
failure, which at first glance seems very straightforward, is a tricky process in
military recruiting. Absolute numbers and trends can be presented in many
different ways, making it hard to see what’s really happening over time. For
example, one might report retention rates as either “nearly half of first-term
enlistees opt to reenlist after their first term of service” or “the military loses
29
more than half of all first-term enlistees.” As Mark Twain and others before
him suggested, there are three kinds of lies: “lies, damn lies, and statistics.” In
the realm of military recruiting, statistics are especially likely to be unclear
indicators, partly because recruiting numbers tend to reflect only snapshots of
particular service branches at particular moments rather than an overall
assessment of military personnel. Earlier, Warrington Parker mentioned the
diversity across the military in terms of individual policies, a useful reminder
that the military is not a single institution, but a collection of different services
with various missions, occupational specialties, and personnel needs. The
culture of the Air Force, the Navy, the Army, and certainly the Marine Corps, is
distinctive from its sister services, as are the regulations and, to some degree, the
29. Re-enlistment rates vary across the branches of service and occupational specialties as well
as over time; many government-sponsored studies have investigated the factors that affect retention.
See generally, e.g., JAMES HOSEK, JENNIFER KAVANAGH & LAURA MILLER, HOW DEPLOYMENTS AFFECT
SERVICEMEMBERS (2006); JAMES HOSEK, NEW MEASURE OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL QUALITY REVEALS
THAT SERVICES RETAIN HIGHER QUALITY PERSONNEL (2004); JAMES HOSEK, DEPLOYMENT, RETENTION,
AND COMPENSATION (2004).
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legal structures of each. The services do not always act in concert, nor are their
goals entirely consistent. Respecting those differences and the tensions that
result is a key part of understanding both military recruiting and the roles of
military lawyers in general.
Notwithstanding the complexity involved in assessing military recruiting,
there are some changes that have taken place in recent years that must be
reckoned with to appreciate the current interplay of law, policy, and military
personnel. The shift away from conscription to an all-volunteer force has
effected a dramatic change in the make-up and diversity of the United States
30
armed forces. When, in Grutter v. Bollinger, a group of prominent retired
generals and admirals filed an amicus curiae brief (one of a record-setting
number of amici, and one that earned a quotation in Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court) in support of the University of Michigan’s
affirmative-action practices, they represented the military as the standard31
bearers of diversity. Those retired military leaders set forth what is now
common wisdom in the armed forces: a conviction that the military needs
diversity in order to succeed. This premise was not an accepted truth when the
all volunteer force was hatched in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Those who
planned for the end of the draft didn’t think that the military would change
significantly with the end of conscription. They were wrong. The military did
change—in a dramatic fashion. A telling example is the difference in the gender
demographics of military personnel. As the limits placed on women’s enlistment
and advancement were lifted with the end of the draft, women rescued the early
all volunteer force by enlisting in significant numbers and by raising the
educational standards of the military. In the mid 1970s, the percentage of male
high school graduates who enlisted fell as low as fifty-two percent; the number
of enlisted women who were high school graduates never dropped below
32
eighty-eight percent. The scores of women on military entrance exams were
33
also higher than the scores of men. Without female volunteers, the military
would have suffered dramatic shortfalls in personnel strength and capability.
Members of racial minorities performed similar rescue missions after the
end of the draft. During the first decade of the all-volunteer force, the
34
percentage of African Americans serving doubled. The advent of gender and
racial integration made it possible for the military to fill its ranks without relying
on the forcible service of conscripts. The demographic evolution of the military
continued after the early years of the all-volunteer force. For example, consider
the overlap between the two groups I mentioned so far: African Americans and
women. Today, the number of African American women in the service is

30. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
31. See, e.g., id. at 331 (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al., as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (Feb. 21, 2003) (No. 02241), 2003 WL 1787554). See also Lauren Robel, Affirmative Action: Lessons from the Military (2003),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/robel.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
32. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth L. Hillman, The Female Shape of the All-Volunteer Force, in IRAQ
AND THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM, OR, HOW NOT TO LEARN FROM THE PAST (Marilyn B. Young & Lloyd
C. Garner eds., 2007).
33. See id.
34. See id.
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disproportionately high compared to their representation in the U.S. population:
African Americans now constitute about thirty percent of all of the women in
35
the Armed Forces and are the fastest-growing segment of veterans. To
compress a much longer and intricate story, these shifts reflect the confluences
of social change and political shifts on the demographics of the military. That
deeper history of military recruiting and retention after the end of conscription
is relevant in understanding the ways in which the burdens and benefits of
military service have been allocated since the Vietnam War.
Today, our military institutions are struggling to recruit successfully,
though the extent of that struggle varies by branch and by military specialty. For
example, the JAG corps seems to have little difficulty finding willing applicants;
the Navy has apparently advised its selection boards not to take more than half
of the applicants for JAG corps positions in the Navy and similar boards in the
36
Army and the Air Force have been able to be comparably selective. The Marine
Corps, however, has a harder time recruiting for its JAG corps—with good
reason. All Marines, JAG officers included, must endure the basic training in
infantry skills that the Marine Corps considers fundamental.
The challenges that face the military in other areas of recruiting, however,
especially in the Army, have forced the United States to invest tremendous
resources in attracting volunteers. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the DOD
spent $592 million on recruiting advertising alone—and another $455 million on
enlistment bonuses, college fund contributions, student loan repayments, and
37
other such allotments in an effort to attract and retain qualified volunteers. The
Army and other services have developed sophisticated marketing strategies to
reach potential volunteers. In addition, the services have relaxed entrance
standards to expand the groups of persons eligible for military service. For
example, the Army has increased the number of recruits they will take from
“Category Four,” a classification for applicants with lower test scores and
38
aptitude assessments. In 2006, the Army and Army reserves convinced
Congress to raise the maximum age of enlistment from thirty-five to forty-two
39
years of age. In 2002, President Bush issued an order streamlining the process
by which citizenship is granted to foreign service members, giving recruiters yet
another opportunity to attract new groups to military service. In 2006, there

35. See id.
36. See 150 CONG. REC. H1709 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Meehan). See also
generally Eugene R. Kim, The Judge Advocate Recruiting Office: The Gateway to Service, ARMY LAW., June
2004, at 34; U.S. Army, Army JAG Corps, http://www.goarmy.com/jag/ (advertising the Army’s
JAG corps) (last visited Mar. 27, 2007); United States Navy JAG, Careers, http://www.jag.navy.mil/
Careers/Careers3.htm (advertising the Navy’s JAG corps, which includes the Marine Corps) (last
visited Mar. 27, 2007); U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate Recruiting http://www.jagusaf.hq.af.mil/
(advertising the Air Force’s JAG corps) (last visited Mar. 27, 2007); U.S. Coast Guard Legal, Career
Resources–CG Legal, http://www.uscg.mil/legal/recruit/index.htm (advertising the Coast Guard’s
JAG corps) (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
37. See GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY RECRUITING: DOD NEEDS TO ESTABLISH
OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES TO BETTER EVALUATE ADVERTISING’S EFFECTIVENESS 6 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031005.pdf; GAO, MILITARY PERSONNEL 2005, supra note 27, at 4.
38. See, e.g., Nick Turse, U.S. is recruiting misfits for army, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 2006, at F-6.
39. See, e.g., Patrik Jonsson, Newest Army Recruits: the Over-35 Crowd, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 6, 2006, at 1.
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were almost 70,000 foreign-born persons serving in the military; many have, or
40
are now, transitioning to U.S. citizenship All of these measures have served to
increase the number of potential military recruits.
Because these ongoing campaigns to revise the laws and policies that limit
or expand military recruiters’ access to segments of the population is directly
relevant to the question of whether or not the armed forces needs the services of
lesbian and gay lawyers and lesbian and gay troops in general, I want to report
one more set of recent recruiting numbers. According to the Department of
Defense, half of all of the youth in the country, age sixteen to twenty-one, are
41
disqualified for military service because of physical or mental deficits. Those
deficits include asthma and obesity, illegal drug use, or the use of prescription
antidepressants; they also include character and moral unfitness. Waivers for all
of these disqualifiers are available, however, and they are routinely granted
today; in fact, while the number of character and moral waivers seemed to be
42
down somewhat in 2005, the number of physical waivers was up.
Before I close this brief review of the military’s interest in, and military
lawyers’ responsibility for, preserving the legitimacy of war and meeting the
personnel demands of military operations, I’d like to return to a theme I
mentioned at the start of these remarks: the importance of grapping with the
essential nature of military duty and institutions as well as the legal
discrimination that continues today. Before we can trace a path toward dignity
and equality for all persons in the military through the minefields of the “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and the Solomon Amendment, we have to reckon with
the bigger landscape in which those minefields exist. We have to understand the
military missions that we ask our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to take
part in; we have to understand the harm and the good that happens at the hands
of American troops around the world and here at home; we need to recognize
who bears the burden of military service; and we need to understand the roles
and limits of the law in restraining or encouraging militarization in American
policy and culture.
Warrington noted a few minutes ago that one of the basic tenets of First
Amendment jurisprudence is the idea that one cannot be forced to convey a
message with which one disagrees, reflecting the idea that “compelled speech”
is anathema to our cherished freedom of speech. Because of this legal doctrine,
in at least some instances the Constitution protects us from being forced to say
something that we don’t want to say. Before we all line up to enlist in military
service, whether “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is repealed or not, I think we ought to
be clear about exactly what messages we will be sending about law, war, and
human rights.

40. See Joseph G. Miller, Fast Track to Naturalization: Service, U.S. Armed Forces, 39 MD. BAR J. 44,
46 (July–Aug. 2006).
41. See GAO, MILITARY PERSONNEL 2005, supra note 27, at 4.
42. See id. at 69.
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IV. “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”
MS. GREER:
We move from considering the military generally to gays in the military
and, specifically, the statute that is known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” I want to
take a moment to talk about the statute. Occasionally, during discussion of the
military’s discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the real meaning of
the statute is lost. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is not in fact the military’s policy.
Congress passed a statute to the effect of: “You shall be separated from the
military if you make a statement that you are homosexual or bisexual, if you
engage in a conduct which is broadly defined, or you marry, or attempt to
marry someone of the same gender.” The statute is actually identical to the
regulation that was in place prior to 1993 except for one word. The change was
“homosexuality” to “homosexual conduct.” The word change made little
practical difference, but the change from regulations (the military’s own internal
policy) to a statute (Congress’s policy) was a significant change.
There has been a prohibition in one form or another on gays, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transgender individuals serving in the military since World War
II (and arguably before that). Since World War II, and long before that—Winston
Churchill’s quote comes to mind—there have been gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
in the military. The current ban works much like previous bans. People in the
43
military who are gay, lesbian and bisexual serve until someone who cares finds
out, and then they get kicked out. Over 11,000 gays and lesbians have been
discharged from the military in the twelve years since the implementation of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” There are, however, an estimated 65,000 gays and
lesbians currently serving in the military, a fact which discussions about military
discrimination and the law schools’ response often overlook. We tend to talk
about “the Military,” “the Gay Community,” or “the Law School Community”
as if they are mutually exclusive and separate groups. The military has gay
people in it. The military has lawyers in it. The military has gay lawyers in it,
although, of course, if discovered, they will be discharged.
The goal of the organization I work for, Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network, is to end discrimination in the military so that gays, lesbians and
bisexuals can serve—including as lawyers. We are doing that in several ways,
one of which is through Congress. This is the first Congress to introduce a bill to
repeal the statute known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” The legislation introduced
in the House of Representatives would require non-discrimination. That bill is
currently in the House of Representatives. As of now, there is no companion bill
in the Senate. The legislation, the Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2006,
H.R. 1059, has 118 cosponsors. In other words, there are 118 members of
Congress who have stood up and said, “This is wrong and it needs to change.”
The level of support for the bill is remarkable and evidences significant progress
since 1993. There is a way to go before we have support sufficient to pass that
law. Further, the current president is not likely to sign into law a bill lifting the

43. In discussing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” I only reference gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. The
statute specifically applies to homosexuals and bisexuals. Transgender persons are also banned from
military service, but under a regulatory scheme separate from “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”
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ban on gays in the military. The power to change the prohibition on open service
lies in Congress’ hands.
Discrimination in the military on the basis of sexual orientation can also
change through the courts; there are several current challenges to the
constitutionality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” You might say, “Why now? It’s
2006. Didn’t this law come into effect in 1994? Were there not previous
constitutional challenges?” Yes, there were.
Immediately after passage of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” there were many
challenges to the constitutionality of the statute. They all lost. Four Circuit
Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, all upheld the constitutionality of “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.” Why are there challenges now? If there are four Circuits that
have already ruled on the constitutionality of the statute the question is closed,
44
isn’t it? The answer is Lawrence v Texas. All of the prior decisions ruling on the
constitutionality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” were based either explicitly or
45
implicitly on Bowers v. Hardwick. Bowers was the root of many evils, including
being one of the pillars that held up the prohibition on gays in the military.
Lawrence explicitly ruled that Bowers was wrong when it was decided, therefore,
perhaps now there is an opportunity to go back and challenge the
constitutionality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” I certainly hope so. I thought “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” was unconstitutional before Lawrence. I think so now. I will
review the current challenges, but first I will discuss something a little closer to
home and closer to Lawrence: sodomy.
There is a statute prohibiting sodomy in the military: Article 125 of the
46
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Article 125 is a very broadly written
statute from the 1950s. The drafters of the UCMJ essentially took the Maryland
and Washington, D.C. sodomy statutes and put it into the military code. In the
military, anything that is not missionary position is sodomy. In the military,
unlike in the civilian world, straight people are actually prosecuted for sodomy
regularly. A survey of the appellate cases in the military criminal courts where
there was a conviction for consensual sodomy found eighty-six cases in a threeyear period. All but three involved heterosexual men convicted of conduct with
a woman. One was a woman for conduct with a man, and two were for conduct
between two men.
It is surprising to many that people are convicted under sodomy laws for
heterosexual sexual conduct under the military statute. One reason for this is the
way the UCMJ is written. Under the UCMJ, the only way to prosecute certain
types of forcible sexual conduct is through the sodomy statute. Many of the
consensual sodomy convictions result from situations where the original charge
is forcible sodomy and the defense is that the conduct was consensual.
When Lawrence was decided there were many individuals with consensual
sodomy convictions within the military criminal appellate system. Lawrence,
therefore, had its first application in the military context in the military criminal
court system. Almost immediately appellants began to challenge their
conviction for consensual sodomy. One case, United States v. Marcum, came
44.
45.
46.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).
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before the military’s highest criminal court: the Court of Appeals of the Armed
47
Forces (CAAF). United States v. Marcum took the opportunity to address the
effect of Lawrence on Article 125. There had, of course, been prior challenges to
48
Article 125 that had been rejected because of Bowers.
The court in Marcum made several noteworthy moves, the most important
of which was finding that Lawrence had not been decided on a bare rational basis
49
standard. First, the court found that Lawrence applied to the military. The
government had actually argued that because Lawrence applied to a state statute
50
and the military’s criminal system is different, Lawrence shouldn’t even apply.
However, the Marcum court said that Lawrence applies to the military: military
51
members do not lose all of their constitutional rights upon beginning service.
The court then turned to the standard of review required by Lawrence. The court
was unsure whether it was rational basis or strict scrutiny, but the court said it
52
has to require a searching constitutional inquiry. At the time, we were very
disappointed with the finding; however, Marcum is currently one of the most
liberal readings of the standard of review in Lawrence and one of the most
powerful.
The Marcum court proceeded to set forth a very interesting three-part test.
First, the determination must be made whether this is “Lawrence-type” conduct:
53
“Is this private, consensual sexual activity with an adult?” Second, if the
conduct is “Lawrence-type,” a determination must be made of whether the
conduct falls under the “Lawrence exceptions,” for example, conduct with a
54
minor or without consent. Finally, if the conduct meets the first two prongs,
one must ask if there is a military reason to uphold this conviction: Is there a
special need for the military to prohibit this particular type of conduct—a need
55
that outweighs Lawrence and the protections provided there?
In Marcum, the petitioner was convicted of conduct with an immediate
56
subordinate. Marcum was a male instructor and the conduct was with a male
student. The Marcum court found that this was a situation where consent was
difficult to give because Marcum had so much authority over his subordinate
57
and thus Marcum’s conviction was upheld.

47. 60 M.J. 198 (2004).
48. See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
substantive due process argument because, under Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.
1991), any “substantive due process claim . . . was foreclosed by Bowers”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067
(1999); Richenberg v. Perry, 909 F. Supp. 1303, 1313 (D. Neb. 1995) (rejecting right of privacy claim
based on Schowengerdt and other cases relying on Bowers), aff’d, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1426 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Bowers forecloses “heightened scrutiny” of “government regulation of homosexual conduct”).
49. 60 M.J. at 205.
50. Id. at 203.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 204.
53. Id. at 206.
54. Id. at 206–07.
55. Id. at 207.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 208.
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Following Marcum, there has been a growing split within the military
criminal appellate courts. The Navy-Marine Court of Criminal Appeals
(NMCCA) has upheld all the convictions for consensual sodomy before it. The
NMCCA has used the third prong as the exception that swallows the rule. Very
little is required to establish that there is a military reason to prohibit the
conduct. In one instance, a service member, married to a Japanese national, was
bringing other women into his barracks room, engaging in oral sex, and then
bragging about it. The NMCCA found that this behavior was an embarrassment
to the Navy, which justified upholding the conviction. The Army Court of
Criminal Appeals (ACCA) has gone in a completely different direction. It has
overturned several convictions and has applied the rules much more stringently.
The ACCA’s interpretation of Marcum is that service members can
constitutionally be convicted for private conduct between adults.
The legal landscape is still uncertain for Article 125, the military’s sodomy
statute. Eventually, there will be further clarification from CAAF, unless
Congress changes the statute. Interestingly, the Pentagon, after several years of
deliberating what Lawrence meant, recommended to Congress that the UCMJ be
changed to remove the consensual part of the military sodomy statute.
Congress, however, has not leapt to action to change the statute, and right
before an election, I do not think we are going to see a radical change in the
military sodomy law. On the other hand, the Pentagon does have influence with
Congress, and hopefully, that law will be changed.
How is Marcum relevant to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”? It is relevant for three
reasons. First, it is relevant because the standard of review in Lawrence is
relevant to any due process claim being brought forward now; Marcum held the
standard was higher than rational basis. Second, it is relevant because Marcum
made clear that Lawrence applies in the military context. Finally, it is relevant
because the existence of the sodomy statute (even though it is applied mostly in
opposite-sex contexts) has always been used as a justification for upholding the
ban on service by gays and lesbians.
The Marcum decision, therefore, although not a declaration that Article 125
as applied to consensual conduct is unconstitutional, is an important case that
we hope will help in the challenges to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” There are three
challenges currently pending. One is a case in which SLDN is co-counsel with
58
Wilmer Hale LLP, called Cook v. Rumsfeld. Cook is a case brought by twelve
veterans who each have amazing and compelling stories; some have served for
over ten years, some have served in combat, some served a short period of time,
and they are from every service except for the Marine Corps. The twelve
veterans in Cook are challenging the constitutionality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
59
and seeking to return to the military. The plaintiffs in Cook are not seeking any
sort of back pay or raise in rank; they just want to go back and serve their
country. The Cook case was filed in district court in Boston. The district court

58. 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass. 2006) (granting government’s motion to dismiss), reh’g denied,
2006 WL 2559766, No. 04-12546-GAO, slip op. at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2006), appeal argued sub nom,
Cook v. Gates, No. 06-2313 (1st Cir. Mar. 7, 2007).
59. Id.
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judge dismissed the case and it is on appeal to the First Circuit Court of
Appeals.
60
The second case is Log Cabin Republicans (LCR) v. United States. The LCR
case was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California as an associational challenge to the constitutionality of “Don’t Ask,
61
Don’t Tell.” The case was dismissed for lack of standing. It has now been re62
filed with a named plaintiff, Alex Nicholson. There is currently pending a
motion to dismiss in that case.
The third case, Witt v. United States Air Force, was filed in Washington
63
State. Witt was brought by a private attorney and the ACLU of Washington
State. Maj. Margaret Witt is still serving and has been in the Air Force for
eighteen years. Witt, a member of the reserves, was told to stop reporting to drill
64
when an investigation began. The procedural history is complicated. Simply
put, the case was dismissed by the district court judge and is on appeal to the
65
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. All three cases
have three primary arguments: that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” violates due
process, equal protection, and the First Amendment. The arguments around the
due process clause are significantly different from the earlier cases because of
Lawrence. The District Court decisions in both Witt and Cook hinged on what
66
Lawrence means. The judges, and particularly the judge in the Cook case,
wrestled with the standard of review. Unfortunately, both district judges
concluded that Lawrence only requires bare-minimum rational basis review—
67
and nothing more. We are hopeful that, on appeal, Lawrence will be more
broadly interpreted and the challenges will proceed and be successful.
V. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND ENGAGING THE MILITARY
PROF. MAZUR:
Rumsfeld v. FAIR says, “Students and faculty are free to associate to voice
68
their disapproval of the military’s message.” This is what Rumsfeld v. FAIR
invites us to do, but it is a trap. If this is all we do, nothing will change. If all we
do is increase the volume of our disapproval in the belief that it will send the
same message as the exclusion of military recruiters from law schools, nothing
will change. The result in FAIR gives law schools a new opportunity to engage
the military in ways that will strengthen civilian control and make it more likely
that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” will be invalidated or repealed.
People tend to view the military as this monolithic, unchanging institution.
They say, “Well, the military is the way it is because it is the military.” This is

60. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 04-08425 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2006) (order
dismissing for lack of standing).
61. Id.
62. Id., refiled sub nom, Nicholson v. United States, No. 04-08425 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2006).
63. 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
64. Id. at 1141.
65. Id., appeal docketed, No. 06-35644 (9th Cir.).
66. Witt, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 393–96 (D. Mass. 2006).
67. Witt, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1145; Cook, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 395–96.
68. FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 126 U.S. 1297, 1301 (2006).
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not true at all. The character and the nature of the military are very much
shaped by the forces that civilians bring to bear on it. The military, in fact, has
changed dramatically since the Vietnam War for two reasons. First, as we have
already talked about a little, the end of the draft has made the military much less
politically representative than it used to be. Second, since the Vietnam War, we
have seen the rise of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of judicial deference to the
military.
Judicial deference is a very convenient device for avoiding conversations
about matters related to the military: it is used to discourage true engagement
across the civil-military line, it is used to distance civilian society from the
military, and it is used to limit governmental accountability for military policy.
Judicial deference to the military is grounded in the assumption that the military
is a separate society, distant from the civilian world in terms of experience,
culture, and morality. The doctrine of judicial deference assumes that military
issues are uniquely inaccessible to civilians and, therefore, the military should
not be subject to law in the same way that other civilian institutions in
government are. It exempts the military from normal constitutional review on
the basis that courts cannot understand the needs of the military.
There are two well-known cases for anyone who has attended law school:
Rostker v. Goldberg, holding that Congress need not constitutionally justify the
69
exclusion of women from registration for the draft; and Goldman v. Weinberger,
holding that the Air Force need not constitutionally justify its decision to punish
70
the wearing of religious headgear.
Judicial deference, of course, is the principal means of defending “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.” Justifications for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” can be less than
rational—even less than plausible—because of the assumption that it is not the
place of courts to require either Congress or the military to explain or justify its
judgment. The problem for us is that law schools have relied on these same
themes of separatism and distance in expressing their disagreement with “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.” Before FAIR, law schools sought to physically distance the
military from the law school community. After FAIR, law schools will likely
often substitute protest as a means of attempting to physically distance—or at
least to intellectually distance—the military from law schools, and
unfortunately, this distance is then going to be used to further reinforce the need
for judicial deference to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”
Law schools take a very “out of sight, out of mind” approach to the
military and to military legal issues. They see the military’s presence, and not its
underlying policies, as the principal problem. Much of what they do is focused
on reacting to the military’s temporary, periodic presence instead of directly
engaging the military and its legal issues on a full-time basis.
In distancing themselves from the military, law schools are only joining in a
larger trend of the last thirty years, since the end of the Vietnam War, in which
institutions of law across the board are abdicating their responsibility for civilian
control of the military. Courts have already deemed themselves incompetent to
understand military issues, and so they defer to congressional and military
69.
70.

453 U.S. 57 (1981).
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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judgment. Law professors have completely lost interest in legal control of the
military, seemingly afflicted with a bad case of deference themselves. There was
once a day when law schools were major participants in every facet of military
legal reform, but no more; they have absolutely no seat at the table.
Law schools need to think about whether the means they choose to affirm
values of equality are the most productive means. If distancing ourselves from
the military is only going to reinforce a system of deference in which the
military can then be used to deny equality, we need to rethink that strategy. I
argue that law schools need to actively engage the military, not disengage
themselves from it. They need to bring the military inside the law school
community and bring military issues and military scholarship within the law
school community. We need a commitment to become knowledgeable, credible
participants in discussions about every facet of military legal reform.
I think one of the reasons that law schools have not done this is the
unspoken assumption that any engagement with the military, or any expression
of interest in the military or its issues, somehow indicates an agreement with the
military or betrays a commitment to equality. What we worry about most, more
than anything else, is that if we do not object to the military’s presence, then it
means we do not object to their policies, and I would argue that those two things
are not connected to one another.
We need a renewed emphasis in law schools on all aspects of military legal
reform. We need joint intellectual pursuits between law schools and military
lawyers. We need visiting military law professors in civilian law schools. We
need visiting military courts operating in law schools.
Today—and I think this is the thing people don’t understand—we are
closer than at any time since 1993 to reaching a consensus with the military that
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is counterproductive. Now, we are not near a consensus
with Congress, but we are near a consensus with the military. We cannot afford
to treat the military just like any other employer who fails to affirm a nondiscrimination policy. With other civilian employers who fail to comply, we
shun them, we send them away. We have no continuing responsibility for them,
and they have no continuing effect on us. The military, however, is an employer
of constitutional magnitude for which law schools have an institutional
obligation. We have an institutional obligation to participate in civilian control
of the military.
Recent events have taught us very dramatically that when institutions of
law—law schools, courts, and lawyers—withdraw from active participation in
civilian control of the military, it has a real effect on whether the military stays in
its lane under the Constitution. I can draw you a direct line that runs from the
mindset of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” through Abu Ghraib and claims of immunity
for misconduct under the law of war.
We cannot afford to distance ourselves from the military if that distance is
going to harden judicial doctrines that protect “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Thank
you very much.
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VI. SELECTED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
President Harry Truman, as Commander-in-Chief, integrated the armed
forces by executive order. I gather that, before Congress enacted “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” the president could have done the same as to homosexuals. In light
of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute, may the president issue an executive
order overturning the policy?
MS. GREER:
No. We have law professors and lawyers up here; I am sure we could get
really creative in making up ways that the president could try and do that, but it
would be pretty much flying in the face of a congressional statute and a
congressional mandate. There are fun things that you could do in terms of
enforcement and in terms of the regulations, but the statute is pretty clear. There
is some wiggle room there, but it is a statute that Congress is going to have to
address to really get rid of the ban.
PROF. HILLMAN:
The only thing I would add to that is that Truman’s order started the ball
rolling on racial integration, but did not do it by itself. There was a lot of
unevenness in implementation, and it mandated equality of treatment, a
standard that was not met for decades. So it is complicated. It is not a simple
order that changes anything in the military. So even if a President Kerry were
able to do that, it would have required a complicated set of regulations and
steps to effect a big change.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
I have two questions about the bill—with the marvelous title of “Military
Readiness Enhancement Act”—that I understand is before Congress and may
repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” First, does it explicitly remove Article 125 from
the Uniform Code of Military Justice? And second, if Congress were to pass the
Act, would President Bush veto it?
MS. GREER:
The bill itself is called the Military Readiness Enhancement Act, and it is
very simple and reasonably conservative. All it does is allow people to serve in
the military who are openly gay. It is very clear that it does not address
domestic partner issues. It does not allow you family rights. It explicitly
references the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). It also is very clear that it does
not change conduct rules. You still have to live by the same conduct rules as
everyone else, which includes Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, and part of that is just politics. Sodomy is very incendiary. Moreover, as
a legal matter, you do not need to get rid of Article 125 in order to allow gay
people to serve in the military. It is really a statute that applies mostly to
heterosexual people. The bill itself is designed to simply allow people to serve in
the military. In terms of this administration, they have only made two
statements on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” one of which is, “It stays.” Bush is a
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” man, and the Republican leadership in Congress is not
supportive of repeal at all. The Chairs of the Armed Services Committee in the
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House and Senate are also not in favor of repeal, and so if it got to President
Bush’s desk, there is no doubt that he would veto it.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
You stressed several times that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has actually
become enacted through Congress statutorily and is not just a regulation of the
military anymore, and that got me thinking about deference. Does the fact that it
is an act of Congress arguably give us a lower degree of deference than the
military is entitled to, since it is actually not just the military’s law but Congress’
statute now?
PROF. MAZUR:
It is really amazing what a flexible, malleable doctrine judicial deference to
the military is. Sometimes, like in the Goldman v. Weinberger case in which the
military made a particular decision about whether a member of the Air Force
could wear religious headgear, the Court’s decision is deferential to the Air
71
Force’s judgment. However, in situations in which the military-related
judgment is actually made by Congress and is enacted into law, the doctrine
very cleverly morphs and becomes deferential to Congress’s judgment about the
72
military. On the other hand, in Rostker v. Goldberg —concerning if women
needed to be registered for the draft when men were—the military argued in
favor of registering women. They said, “We can use tens of thousands of women
were we ever to have a draft.” Congress said, “Never on our watch are women
going to be drafted.” Yet, the Court still wrote an opinion that depended on this
idea of judicial deference to military judgment, even though it was Congress’
military judgment which disagreed with the military’s judgment.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
This question is for Prof. Mazur. You seem to be saying that we should find
ways of constructively engaging the military, and I can see where there may be
some common ground on other issues. How, though, do you think it is possible
to constructively engage the military, since they are under no obligation to
engage us on issues like “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and its position on hiring
women and things like that? How do we get them to engage us on a very
practical level?
PROF. MAZUR:
I think the best way to do that is to have something of value to offer, and I
think law schools are not offering anything of value right now. There was a time
when law school faculties carried enormous expertise about military law and
military legal reform, and they were actually the first call that would be made
when the military was sitting down and beginning to think about how it was
going to reform its laws. Today, that would be the last call the military would
make, because that expertise, over the last generation, really has evaporated. I
think the way that you bring together two voluntary institutions, which are not
required to engage with each other, is to show that each side has something to

71.
72.

475 U.S. 503 (1986).
453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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offer of value to the other, and I think it is possible that law schools could do
that if we made an institutional commitment to building that knowledge and
that credibility. Does anyone else want to add something to that?
PROF. HILLMAN:
Yeah. I have to say I think Aaron Belkin’s work is a great example of that.
He is a political scientist, not a law professor, but the reason that Diane can say
that the military is this close to agreeing institutionally that “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” is a bad idea, is driven by concerns about efficiency and personnel, but also
by a conversion that Aaron has almost single-handedly accomplished. He has
gone to the war colleges. He has talked to commanders. He has brought masses
of sociological and anthropological and political science modeling to this issue
of whether or not it really is a disaster to let people serve openly in the military,
and it has changed people’s minds. I think Aaron has actually gone out and
taken his message to the military in a way that works. That said, there is
resistance from the military that you have to be willing to overcome. It is not
easy. In my experience, military lawyers are experienced and they are
professionals, and they know what they think about a lot of these issues, and
they think the rest of us do not have much to offer.
One time, I was at a conference of military judges, and I was speaking
about the recommendations of a blue ribbon panel called the Cox Commission
that suggested changes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The Cox
Comission’s recommendations were not what I would have said should change
about the UCMJ—I was just the messenger at this conference. I was just
reporting on what these people [the Cox Commission]—who were very
experienced in the area of military law—said should change, and the conference
attendees were completely dismissive. They really did not want to hear it, and
they said they do not have time to deal with those kinds of things. However,
there were some changes. One change that the Commission recommended
applies to the sexual assault code in the UCMJ, containing the articles that
address rape, carnal knowledge, and sodomy. Currently, there are pending
changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial that actually make big changes in the
way that the military will prosecute sexual assault. So it is possible for these
things to get through, but there is institutional resistance by the armed forces,
apart from our own disengagement, that plays a role here.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
Two quick, unrelated questions. I wondered if you could say something
about the demographics of the 11,000 people that have been dismissed, as
between men and women and by race, and if there has been a shift in the
demographics of dismissals under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Second, if somebody
could speak briefly about the generational change that is happening, both
among enlisted personnel and junior officers—especially in a time of war, when
there is discretion about dismissals, is there a generational tipping point that is
occurring, where there is a broader disregard for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
(particularly at a time of war), that ultimately undermines the legitimacy of
Congress’s position on this?
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MS. GREER:
I will answer the demographic question first because that is easiest. Of the
11,000 who have been separated, the one consistent demographic is women are
about fifteen percent of the services. It varies from service to service, and they
have consistently been about thirty percent of the discharges every year. So
women are disproportionately discharged in a fairly significant way. In terms of
race, service, and rank, for the most part, they match the demographics within
the military. So there is no huge, disproportionate skew other than rank and age.
Disproportionately, the people who are discharged tend to be junior enlisted
officers, so there is also a skew in terms of the fact that it is the more junior
personnel that tend to be hit hardest by the law.
In terms of the generational shift, and I would like some of my fellow
panelists to comment on this too—as I encounter it in my work, it is stunning.
Even in the five years that I have been working at Servicemembers’ Legal
Defense Network (SLDN)—and we do have a legal services program—in
addition to our other work, my colleagues and I talk to gay and lesbian service
members everyday.
We also talk to people on both the defense side and the command side in
the JAG shops. We talk to commanders, and the changes are remarkable. The
vast majority of the people that we talk to do not care whether gays and lesbians
serve openly within the military. We are moving to a point where they really do
not care, and in addition to not really caring if their troop is gay or not,
especially if it is a good troop, it is an inconvenience to them. It is annoying to
them to have to kick somebody out. It is an administrative nightmare. It affects
their retention numbers. The response that I get, mostly from commands, is that
this is a complete waste of their time and a pain and they are losing a good
service member. We talked to the younger, straight service members—they do
not care. They do not think this is an issue, and one of my biggest challenges is
that a lot of the gay service members do not think it is an issue, so they are
reasonably out, and then they get in trouble. I do think there is a generational
shift.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
Just two brief questions. I am a law school career-services person. Was
Rumsfeld v. FAIR unanimous; and also, do you know whether federal funding
for any law school has either been challenged or cut under the Solomon
Amendment?
MR. PARKER:
The FAIR decision was almost unanimous because Justice Alito did not
participate, but otherwise it was eight–zero. There have been a few law schools
who I understand have foregone federal funding. No school has had its federal
funding cut out through a challenge, and I do not remember the names of the
law schools, but a few independents have just decided—none affiliated with a
larger school—to forego federal funding altogether.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
Hello, when I was in the military, and a soldier was just not happy with the
military, usually the first option would be to say that he was gay, and usually he
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was not gay. So, I was wondering, do you have numbers that speak to the
number of soldiers who were separated under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” or
homosexual conduct regulations who were not actually homosexual?
MS. GREER:
We don’t have any good numbers on that. I actually think that is a really
fascinating point to bring up. Periodically, we hear from people in the Pentagon
that soldiers are just saying they are gay to get out of their military service
obligations. We hear that from some commanders, too. This goes to the
absurdity of this law. First, there is no way to tell if somebody is really gay or
not. There is not a litmus test for good, bad, or otherwise. The statute says that,
if you say you are gay, you should be separated. So, under the statute, if you say
you are gay, there is now a presumption that you have the propensity to engage
in homosexual conduct, and you now have to prove otherwise. The people who
contact us for help, who we have worked with, and who have been kicked out,
almost without exception have been gay or lesbian and have not been trying to
get out of their military service obligations. We have actually had straight
people who were accused of being gay, and who had to fight really hard to
prove that they were not gay. One of the things that I say when people raise this
issue is,
If you are worried about people saying they are gay to get out of their military
obligation, change the law. Repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” and then you can get
back to what you should be doing, which is worrying about disruptive conduct.
Take care of the disruptive conduct, but let’s get on with the business of having
a good, effective military and stop kicking people out because they say they are
gay.

PROF. HILLMAN:
Yeah, the numbers are really deceptive here. SLDN’s work in tracking this
is essential to all of us, but it does not begin to account for all the people who
leave the service because they happen to realize they are gay at some point
during their service. So there is a huge number of people who do not show up in
those statistics, apart from the renegade straight people trying to escape the
services.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
Hi, I am a career-services person at Fordham Law School, and we have the
military coming on campus in about ten days and then again in the spring. I
would like your input or advice on our protest of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”
Where should we put our focus? It sounds that perhaps one of the best tactics
may be to enlist students from across the nation (or local community members)
to write to representatives in Congress to encourage their support for MREA
[the Military Readiness Enhancement Act]?
PROF. HILLMAN:
I would, of course, be thrilled. The more people tell our members of
Congress that this is an important issue and that the law needs to be changed,
the better. One of our struggles with actually moving this bill through Congress
is that, if the Congressional members do not believe that it is important to their
constituents and they are not hearing about it, then they do not think it is an
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issue that needs to be acted on. So I think that would be a very helpful thing to
do.
PROF. MAZUR:
I think you could say that the administration is not listening to its military
lawyers on detainee policies, on interrogation procedures, and on military
commissions, and it is also not listening to them on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” So, I
think you could link it to other issues, too.
73

MS. WILSON:
I wanted to make a point here. All of you are going to be lawyers, and to
the best of my knowledge, I am practically the only LGBT-identified lawyer in
the United States who routinely practices in the area of military jurisprudence
on an open basis. Certainly, there are other gay or lesbian or bisexual or
transgender lawyers who do some military cases, but it is a small realm. Beth
Hillman serves as an Officer for the National Institute of Military Justice (NIMJ),
which is the coalition of civilians who engage military jurisprudence. I would
suggest to any of you to go to NIMJ’s website and start learning about the huge
world of military justice and law, and to begin the process of educating yourself,
and I would invite all of you to become a part of the Civilian Military Bar. It is a
fascinating group of people, and more importantly, it is part of the engagement
of bringing a civilian perspective. One of my best friends in San Diego is a Navy
judge. Two of the people he respects, actually three of the people he respects in
this world, are sitting on this panel. He asked me a year or so ago if I knew this
“Diane Mazur” person. He had seen her at a conference and thought she was
very impressive. He practiced in the Appellate Defense Division when Beth
Hillman was clerking at the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the highest
military court.
My recruiting for you is that in the incredibly un-lucrative, obscure world
of military jurisprudence, if you pick a small enough, obscure enough, but most
importantly unprofitable enough area of law, you too can become a national
expert. It is my suggestion that some of you go out and make military
jurisprudence some small part of your practice, because when you go to courtsmartial, as I did last month, you will find that you are very well-received. I used
this chance in Washington, D.C. to get sworn in before the Army Court of
Criminal Appeals on Thursday, the only one of the military courts that makes
you show up in person to be sworn in. I got a tour of the Army Legal Services
building right at the Boston tram. They were very happy to see civilians. They
are fascinated with everyone who is crazy enough to be a civilian and do this
work. You bring the face of the civilian world to military jurisprudence and as
lawyers, go back to your law schools and teach it, and as individuals, learn it.
So, I refer you to Beth Hillman’s organizational connection and the wonderful
people at NIMJ who work very hard at keeping civilians attached to military
justice.

73. Bridget J. Wilson is a shareholder in Rosenstein, Wilson & Dean, P.L.C. She is a veteran of
the U.S. Army Reserve and currently serves with the California State Military Reserve as a judge
advocate.
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PROF. MAZUR:
That was Bridget Wilson, who served on a panel yesterday.
MR. PARKER:
Bridget does public service in this area of law and her work is really an
inspiration to all of us. One more thing about the National Institute of Military
Justice (NIMJ): Diane is also on the board, and we are running a program in
November for civilian teachers of military law. It is going to be here in
Washington, D.C. at American University’s Washington College of Law. I work
on education for NIMJ and we are going to primarily invite people who are
teaching or have taught military law- related issues in law schools. The
academics make up two cohorts: the people who are interested now because of
the War on Terror and the legal issues related to the military, and then a much
older cohort that had a big impact on internal military law and criminal justice
many years ago. Our hope, our goal, is to generate some energy and some
connections between these groups of people, so that we can try to do some of
the work Diane and Bridgette talked about.
MS. GREER:
This will be our last question.
FROM THE AUDIENCE:
I was wondering if the panel could comment on other issues under the
Solomon Amendment besides “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” that might inhibit the
military under the standard anti-discrimination policy that most employers that
go to law schools and other campuses are forced or are requested to sign on to.
Are there any other military policies or employment policies that might prohibit
or inhibit the military’s ability to go on campus, outside of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell”? Things that were mentioned earlier were women, as well as transgender
issues; I was wondering if there could be a little bit of expansion of that
discussion.
74

MR. WAGGONER:
Listen, under the FAIR decision, the military can get on campus, period.
The danger of the FAIR decision is what Congress can place funding conditions
on what it can order directly. The Court essentially says in FAIR that Congress
can order law schools to accept the military as recruiters, regardless of their
acceptance of federal funding. So “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is not merely one
limit; one can, just as Prof. Hillman indicated, find other ways in which the
military discriminates against people based on disability and gender, and yet
they are still allowed to go on campus—and the FAIR decision would say they
essentially have a right to go on campus.
PROF. MAZUR:
The situation related to discrimination on the basis of sex is actually in
many ways very parallel to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” controversy, in that the
military today would love to have much more flexibility in the way that it
74. Lawrence W. Waggoner is the Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan Law School.

11__GREER_PARKER_HILLMAN_MAZUR.DOC

6/18/2007 3:06 PM

“RUM, SODOMY, AND THE LASH” 1169
assigns women. Congress—just as it does with “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—very
tenaciously tries to enforce traditional notions of what women should or should
not be doing in military service. So when we target our career services-related
objections toward the treatment of women and speak primarily to the military,
we do not have the best audience, because the military is likely to tell you that it
understands the problem and wishes that it had more flexibility with the
assignment of women. But it is running up against a much more hardened
Congress on this issue, in the same way as in “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” So, I
would say that the questions you raised are valid, but they really raise exactly
the same concerns that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does.
MR. PARKER:
The military did not at all support the Solomon Amendment when it was
enacted, and this is interesting because the FAIR decision starts off with judicial
deference to the military, even though the military did not want this. I do know
that, in California, military recruiters have had a traditionally difficult time
finding people and meeting their recruiting numbers. So this is an issue where
there are certain impediments the military is facing that I do not think they want
to face. The fact that we have a decision that starts off with judicial deference
and then runs into the First Amendment (without really linking the two) is
fascinating, but I think it also hides what is truly at issue here.
MS. GREER:
Alright, well I want to thank my fellow panelists and thank you for getting
up this morning.
[Applause.]

